ESBL (CDS 100% and others 82%, 2011, 6:1b); and (iv) detection of meropenem resistance in Citrobacter freundii mediated by a carbapenemase (CDS method 95%, other methods 71%, 2013, 4:1b).
Some strains adhere to uroepithelium and endocardium and may cause infection in patients without marked immunosuppression.
Device-associated infection also occurs. Enterococci can be found in mixed cultures from intra-abdominal and pelvic infections but recovery usually occurs without targeted enterococcal treatment in uncomplicated cases 1 
Mode of transmission
VRE is transmitted by hands or from the environment. To break transmission, both hand and environmental hygiene are critical.
Airborne dissemination is not important: throat, nasal and airway colonisation with VRE is rare.
A recent modelling paper demonstrates how patient transfer amongst different hospitals within a single region may significantly influence the VRE burden. A sustained increase of 10% in VRE colonisation prevalence in one hospital resulted in a calculated 2.8% (range 0-58%) relative increase in prevalence in other hospitals. The effects took from 1.5 to more than 10 years to manifest. This delay must be considered in research that analyses the impact of control efforts 20 . McBryde used a 'Hidden Markov Model' applied to serial prevalence data to estimate the characteristics of acquisition of VRE and distinguish epidemic versus sporadic acquisition. Using hospital data from Melbourne, this model estimated that 89% of acquisitions were due to ward cross-transmission 21 . 16 .
Period of colonisation
Colonisation pressure, defined as the daily point prevalence of VRE-colonised patients, is an important risk factor for acquisition of VRE and may outweigh other risk factors once 50% or more of patients in a location have been colonised 29 .
Exposure to contaminated surfaces includes rooms previously occupied by VRE colonised patients and exposure to contaminated reused equipment including commodes, shower chairs, thermometers and many other items.
Control of VRE
Control measures for VRE must be practical and effective and take in to account the current epidemiology of infection 16 . 
Standard precautions

Antimicrobial stewardship
Antibiotic stewardship (AMS) is fundamental in the control of major hospital pathogens. In particular, restriction of the use of extended-spectrum cephalosporins, quinolones is of proven worth for VRE, MRSA, MRGN and C. difficile. Intervention studies that have had a measured impact on resistance usually have reduced usage below 10 DDDs/1000 patient-days for third generation cephalosporins and below 30 DDDs/1000 for quinolones 30 . In order to achieve such reductions, replacement with antimicrobial agents that have lesser ecological effects is necessary. The relative 
Hospital design
There are extensive considerations required in order to optimise infection prevention, such as decisions about the number and type of single rooms and the provision of adequate numbers of toilets.
Where possible, dedicated toilets and bathrooms for each patient location are required. All surfaces and equipment must be optimal for routine cleaning and disinfection. Antimicrobial surface materials and coatings require consideration for higher risk locations, including bathrooms and toilets. The Australasian Health Facility
Guidelines are an excellent resource 32 . Toilets in hospitals should have lids that automatically close and flush; lidless toilets aerosolise enteric bacteria during flushing causing extensive contamination.
Hand hygiene
There is good evidence showing that healthcare workers can carry VRE on their hands from one patient to another. Such transmission is more likely to occur when healthcare workers are non-compliant with recommended hand hygiene practice. Consistent compliance with all five components of the WHO Standard is essential. Gloves and impervious gown may also be required if contact with body substances is anticipated.
Provision of hand hygiene facilities/materials for patients is important in acute and subacute healthcare, including residential aged care. Facilitation of patient hand hygiene after toileting and at other times is advisable.
Control of potential fomites
Contamination of the environment and equipment occurs from patients colonised or infected with resistant organisms. Staff clothing, stethoscopes, phones, lanyards, gowns and other reused items are frequently contaminated during clinical care. Clothing standards such as bare-below-the-elbow are especially important for high risk locations (Table 1) as clothing sleeves transfer microorganisms as efficiently as hands and the presence of rings, wrist watches and long sleeves or coats impede effective cleaning of hands prior to patient care.
As a minimum, it is essential that all reusable patient equipment is cleaned and disinfected prior to patient use. Use of patientdedicated equipment is preferred wherever reliable cleaning and disinfection cannot be assured.
Enhanced environmental cleaning and disinfection
Admission to a room previously occupied by a patient with a MRO or C. difficile increases the risk of acquisition. More effective systems of room decontamination are required, especially for high risk units (Table 1) and are shown to markedly reduce the risk of VRE (other MROs and C. difficile) acquisition compared with conventional methods and should become part of the standard of care for high risk units 33 .
The original statement of the standard precautions model required regular (at least daily) cleaning and disinfection of near patient surfaces, bathrooms and toilets regardless of whether the surface appeared clean or not 34 . This is in contrast with the current Australian Infection Control Guidelines that do not specify disinfection except in certain circumstances 35 . Most jurisdictions in Australia have now implemented more stringent routine cleaning and disinfection requirements.
The environmental audit methods for high risk units need to go beyond a visibly clean standard to provide evidence that a surface has actually been cleaned (e.g. by using a fluorescent marker system) and/or whether there is residual bioburden on the surface (e.g. ATPase detection systems or microbiological culture). This information provides essential feedback for all staff who clean and disinfect, which will increase compliance and effectiveness.
The independent importance of the environment is shown by a large recent study from Melbourne; high levels of hand hygiene compliance that were sufficient to reduce hospital MRSA were still associated with continued increases in VRE transmission. VRE control was eventually achieved by an augmented program of routine environmental disinfection with a hypochlorite 36 .
Aseptic practices
Invasive infection may be triggered by poor aseptic practice during an invasive procedure, during manipulation of an invasive device or during preparation of parenteral medication. Routine attention to asepsis training and audits of aseptic practice are now required in Australia by the Safety and Quality standards 31 and is an important way to reduce morbidity from MROs including VRE.
Targeted additional (vertical) measures
Additional measures are warranted in high risk units and for VREcolonised patients at high risk of transmission or infection ( Table 1 ).
The economic, patient and care impacts of isolation are consider- 
Isolation of VRE-colonised patients under transmissionbased contact precautions
This is recommended for VRE-colonised patients in high risk units (Table 1 or however defined).
Dedicated bathroom and toilet facilities are a must and the isolation or cohort areas as a minimum should be subject to daily cleaning and disinfection. Single use glove and gowns should be used by staff upon room entry without neglect of hand hygiene. Patient-dedicated equipment is required where possible.
In outbreak situations, where single rooms or cohort areas are not available, it is worthwhile using gloves and gowns for interactions even with non-colonised neighbouring patients in order to reduce potential patient anxiety and increase the awareness and compliance of clinical staff 16 .
Outbreak interventions
Systems need to be in place to detect outbreaks, especially changes in VRE morbidity that may reflect emergence or introduction of a more virulent strain. The comprehensive approach to outbreak investigation and management is well described in other references 35 and well illustrated by the description of the recent WA VRE outbreak 11 .
Staff compliance with enhanced standard precautions (above) must be audited at the outset and all efforts made to ensure consistent implementation of hygiene and antimicrobial stewardship mea- 
